COVID-19: a fast evolving pandemic. by Whitworth, Jimmy
On 31st December 2019 the WHO office in China received a report of 29 pneumonia cases of 
unknown aetiology in Wuhan city in Hubei province, central China. Within one week it became clear 
that the initial cases were associated with a seafood market where live poultry and wild animals 
were also sold. The virus was quickly identified as a novel beta-coronavirus and the genetic 
sequence was shared on 12th January. The infection is now officially termed COVID-19 and the virus 
SARS-CoV2. News of this outbreak gave many public health officials an involuntary shudder as they 
recalled the parallels with the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak which arose in 
China in November 2002. That outbreak was also caused by a novel coronavirus spilling over from an 
animal reservoir and transmitted by respiratory droplets. SARS spread to many parts of the world 
through international air travel, caused over 8000 cases and 774 deaths, and cost in the region of 
$20 billion to control.  
Within less than a month COVID-19 had spread throughout China, and to neighbouring countries, 
even to the USA and Europe. It became clear that the new virus was highly transmissable from 
person to person, but was considerably less virulent, with less than 20% of cases being classified as 
severe. It has the clinical features of an atypical pneumonia with fever, dry cough, fatigue, dyspnoea 
and myalgia, and is more often severe in those with co-morbidities and the elderly. Since there are 
no specific therapies or vaccines available, standard public health measures appropriate for a virus 
spread by droplet, close contact and on environmental surfaces were instituted. The Chinese 
authorities conducted active case finding and testing, contact tracing and quarantining of cases and 
contacts. The public was advised to stay at home if sick in an effort to control the spread of the virus. 
On 30th January WHO declared the outbreak a Public health Emergency of International Concern, 
their highest level of severity, at a time when there were almost 10 000 confirmed cases, over 200 
deaths, and it had spread to 20 countries.  
The Chinese authorities had by then instituted highly stringent control measures including stopping 
flights and public transport in Wuhan and other major cities, closing animal wet markets, extending 
the New Year holiday period in an effort to prevent mass travel, reducing movements within cities 
and minimising mass gatherings, keeping schools closed, staggering office and factory working 
hours, and restricting movement on the streets. The wearing of face masks became compulsory, and 
in effect the population of Hubei province, over 50 million people, were in quarantine. The 
authorities also built 2 new hospitals with over 2500 beds within two weeks to cope with the surge 
in demand for medical care. 
By the end of February, just two months into the epidemic there had been over 80 000 cases 
confirmed worldwide with over 2700 deaths, vastly surpassing the SARS epidemic. Over 80% of the 
global cases have been reported in Hubei province, although cases have been reported in 33 
countries and territories on six continents. Over 70 countries have instituted travel restrictions. The 
main battle to control this epidemic has been in China, where heroic public health measures have at 
least bought the rest of the world time, and may have reduced the effective reproduction number 
(Rt) close to 1 thereby bring the epidemic under control. However, the rest of the world needs to 
maintain high vigilance as this virus is highly transmissible and can cause severe disease and death, 
as has been seen in countries such as South Korea, Iran and Italy. Indeed, more new cases are now 
being seen outside China than within. Containment through case finding and isolation, and contact 
tracing remains the key public health approach to controlling the epidemic in all parts of the world. 
This is particularly important for countries in subSaharan Africa, and also those parts of South and 
Central America and Asia that are not well prepared for outbreaks. Global solidarity and support are 
essential as infectious diseases can easily cross borders, and as John Nkengasong from the Africa 
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has said “The global health chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link, so a disease threat anywhere can quickly become a threat everywhere.”  
Preparedness to respond to outbreaks is weak in many countries. Of the 45 low-income countries 
that have undertaken a national preparedness assessment, none have been deemed as ready to 
respond, making them particularly vulnerable to outbreaks. There are many reasons for this, 
including worse health and nutrition, exacerbated by high rates of concomitant HIV and tuberculosis, 
and low influenza vaccination rates; poor quality of healthcare and resource constraints: low- and 
middle-income country (LMIC) governments spend on average only $267 annually per person on 
health; vulnerable supply chains and medicine procurement are weak, and up to 30% of medicines 
are substandard or falsified.  
In response to the outbreak, the African Union Commission is strengthening partnerships and 
coordination across the continent, including a common approach for monitoring and movement 
restriction of people at risk for COVID-19 and for information sharing. WHO has found the regional 
readiness level to be only 66%, with critical gaps and a need to strengthen the capacities for 
countries to investigate alerts, treat patients in isolation facilities and improve infection, prevention 
and control (IPC) in health facilities and communities. More than 40 experts have deployed to ten 
countries to support preparedness activities and the diagnostic capacity for COVID-19 has been 
strengthened, with 17 countries now having at least some capacity for laboratory testing. 
The WHO regional office for Africa, in partnership with Africa CDC and others, is working hard to 
prepare African countries for the potential spread of the virus through the Africa Taskforce for 
Coronavirus (AFCOR). This includes developing and implementing national preparedness plans, 
event- and case-based surveillance systems, point of entry controls, traveller screening and contact 
tracing, developing policies for mass gatherings, risk communication, and the handling and 
management of suspect cases. Plans are being developed for the sourcing and stockpiling of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and quality-assured diagnostics.  
There is still a need to scale up support to frontline health workers, ensure additional manufacturing 
capability and reinforce the existing supply chain for personal protective equipment (PPE) and other 
critical medical supplies. Regular communication with the public through trusted experts is a high 
priority. This includes providing advice on what individuals can do to protect themselves, including 
avoiding close contact with people with acute respiratory infections, and with farm and wild animals, 
and promotion of cough etiquette and regular hand washing. 
Research priorities include the development of point of care diagnostics, optimising PPE and 
determining the utility of facemasks. Identification of the animal reservoir to prevent further spill 
over. accelerating the evaluation of therapeutics – especially of remdesivir and Kaleetra, for which 
trials are currently underway in China, and vaccines - which may prove vital in the longer term. All of 
this requires commitments of increased funding for both the outbreak response and research. Other 
priorities include the promotion of the rapid sharing of information, clinical samples and genetic 
sequences, social science research to ensure communities engage and support proposed 
interventions, working to counter misinformation, rumour and myth, natural history studies 
including the documentation of virus shedding, and working to close or make safe animal wet 
markets.  
The threat posed by COVID-19 has cast a spotlight on the shortcomings of health systems in LMICs. 
Countries must invest in emergency preparedness, this is worthwhile considering the cost of 
responding to outbreaks, which for the 2014-16 west Africa Ebola outbreak was estimated at close 
to $US 3 billion. One longer term solution might be to establish a Global Health Security Fund that 
provides incentives for countries to make capital investments to close their preparedness gap. There 
are already some preparedness efforts in place that are paying off in anticipation of COVID-19. For 
instance, investments in Ebola preparedness for the nine countries neighbouring the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo have ensured partner coordination structures are in place, points-of-entry 
screening has been strengthened (particularly at major airports) and isolation units have been 
upgraded to manage suspect cases. Over the years, WHO has developed a national influenza 
network of laboratories and health facilities, which have been able to scale up their diagnostic 
capacity quickly in order to monitor for severe acute respiratory infections and influenza-like 
illnesses. Using these conditions as a proxy for COVID-19 monitoring has not so found any clustering 
or spike of influenza-like cases.   
Ministries of health, national public health institutes, universities, and other public health agencies, 
are therefore working in many ways to fight this new public health threat across the globe. But this 
epidemic is not only a medical emergency and human tragedy, it is starting to affect economic 
activities, and without urgent action the socio-economic effects could have wide implications for 
trade, travel, provision of aid, economic markets, supply chains and the daily lives of people living 
around the world. 
 
 
 
 
